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Abstract
Contact tracing has the potential to help identify, characterize, and predict disease-spreading human
interactions at an unprecedented resolution. However, to realize this potential, we need to utilize data-
driven epidemic models that can operate at a high spatiotemporal resolution and make use of and benefit
from contact tracing data of individuals. Such data-driven models are currently missing, and in this work
we initiate their development using the framework of temporal point processes. Using an efficient sampling
algorithm, we can use our model to quantify the effects that different testing and tracing strategies, social
distancing measures, and business restrictions may have on the course of the disease. Building on this
algorithm, we use Bayesian optimization to estimate the transmission rate due to infectious individuals
at the sites they visit and at their households as well as the mobility reduction due to social distancing
from longitudinal case data. Simulations using real COVID-19 case data and mobility patterns from
several cities and regions in Germany and Switzerland with a wide range of infection levels until today
demonstrate that our model may allow individuals and policy makers to make more effective decisions.
1 Introduction
The novel coronavirus disease COVID-19 has spread from Wuhan to the rest of the world in a matter of
months [1, 2]. Until vaccines become widely available, policymakers need to resort to testing and isolation,
contact tracing, physical distancing, and other containment measures to prevent its spread. In this context,
there have been burgeoning efforts to introduce digital contact tracing systems for automated and fine-grained
monitoring of individual contacts. Among them, we can distinguish between location-based systems, such as
GPS or QR code check-ins [3, 4] and proximity-based systems, such as Bluetooth [5–7]. Here, we argue that
automated and fine-grained monitoring of individual contacts may allow for:
I. More accurate predictions. New data sources may allow us to predict the spread of COVID-19 at
an unprecedented spatiotemporal resolution. This includes when and where new individual infections
may happen and how likely these events are to occur.
II. More effective containment and mitigation. Tracing systems may help us design more effective
strategies to slow down or even prevent the spread of COVID-19, thus allowing authorities to gradually
lift the most restrictive measures with more precision and confidence.
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III. Data-driven insights into disease parameters. Accurate contact tracing may yield insights into
the relative importance of different modalities of disease transmission and allow inference of the unknown
parameters of the transmission and course of COVID-19.
However, to realize the above mentioned capabilities, we need to utilize data-driven models and algorithms
that can operate at a high spatiotemporal resolution and make use of contact tracing data of individuals.
Unfortunately, such data-driven models and algorithms are currently missing. Most of the classical epi-
demiological literature [8–12] has primarily focused on developing models for general population dynamics
rather than the infectious state of any given individual in the population. More recently, there has been
research on modeling individual dynamics of epidemics [13–17], yet this work typically resorts to mean-field
theory and thus does not characterize the dynamic infectious state of each individual over time. Finally, in
the context of the current COVID-19 outbreak, there has been a flurry of work on agent-based epidemic
models [18–31]. However, these models make simplistic assumptions about individual mobility patterns and
do not use COVID-19 case data to estimate their model parameters. As a consequence, they are unable
to accurately characterize the fine-grained effects of testing, contact tracing, and containment measures on
individuals living in geographically diverse regions.
In this work, we develop a flexible modeling framework that is specifically designed to make use of contact
tracing data and make fine-grained spatiotemporal predictions about individual disease spread. Our model
uses marked temporal point processes [32] to represent events when individuals ...
... are exposed, asymptomatic, presymptomatic, symptomatic, hospitalized, recovered, or dead
(Epidemiology).
... check in at different points of interest, where they get in contact with and possibly infect each
other (Mobility).
... are affected by measures such as social distancing and quarantines, or points of interest implement
hygienic and capacity-limiting policies (Containment measures).
... get tested by health authorities or receive the outcome of a test (Testing).
... who were in contact with positively tested individuals are tracked down (Contact tracing).
Within this paradigm, our modeling framework is fully defined by way of a set of conditional intensity
functions, or hazard functions. To realistically model the exposure of individuals at sites, our framework
introduces a new intensity function that is able to characterize the influence that mobility patterns as well
as containment measures have on the risk that each infected individual poses to their community. Our
framework is agnostic to the particular model of mobility patterns and can directly use almost any form of
real mobility data when available, including contact tracing data.
In addition, we design an efficient sampling algorithm for our model, which allows us to simulate the spread
of COVID-19 under a variety of interventions and what-if scenarios using Monte Carlo roll-outs. Moreover,
building on our sampling algorithm, we use Bayesian optimization [33–35] to estimate the transmission rate
due to infectious individuals at the sites they visit, in their households, as well as the mobility reduction due
to social distancing from longitudinal case data. Finally, we showcase our modeling framework using real
COVID-19 case data and mobility patterns from several cities and regions in Germany and Switzerland with
a wide range of infection levels until today. Our results show that our model can be used to estimate the
effect of testing, contact tracing, and containment measures at an unprecedented spatiotemporal resolution
and may ultimately allow individuals and policy makers to make more effective decisions. To enable further
research in this area, we release an open-source implementation of our framework [36].
2 A Spatiotemporal Model of Epidemics
Given a set of individuals V, we track the current state of each single individual i ∈ V using a collection
of state variables, which determine their mobility pattern, epidemiological condition, and degree of testing
and contact tracing, under different social distancing measures and business restrictions. We use stochastic
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Table 1: Epidemiological state variables
State Description Infected Contagious Symptoms
Si(t) is susceptible - - -
Ei(t) is exposed X - -
Iai (t) is asymptomatic,
has mild course of disease X X -
Ipi (t) is pre-symptomatic,
progresses to Isi (t) later on X X -
Isi (t) is symptomatic X X X
Hi(t) is hospitalized X X X
Ri(t) is resistant and recovered - - -
Di(t) has died - - -
differential equations (SDEs) with jumps to realistically model (i) the stochastic nature of mobility patterns
and infection events, (ii) events in continuous time, i.e. not in aggregate over days, and (iii) discrete state
transitions — an individual either does or does not get infected, visit a site, or is selected for quarantine. To
ease the exposition, we describe different types of state variables separately.
2.1 Mobility
Let S be the set of sites individuals can visit. For each individual i, let the indicator Pi,k(t) = 1 if the
individual is at site k ∈ S at time t and Pi,k(t) = 0 otherwise. We characterize the value of the states
Pi,k(t) = 1 using the following SDE with jumps:
dPi,k(t) = dUi,k(t)− dVi,k(t) (1)
where Ui,k(t) and Vi,k(t) are counting processes indicating when individual i arrives at and leaves site k ∈ S,
respectively. Moreover, we define their intensities as follows:
E [dUi,k(t)|H(t)] = λi,k(t)
∏
l∈S
(1− Pi,l(t)) dt
E [dVi,k(t)|H(t)] = Ui,k(t) vk dt
(2)
where λi,k(t) is the rate at which the individual visits site k and 1/vk is the average duration of a visit to
site k, which can be modeled to depend on the individuals age a(i) ∈ A of age groups A. From now on and
above, H(t) denotes the history of arrivals of the corresponding counting processes. This model of mobility
can be substituted by almost any form of real mobility data as long as Pi,k(t) is defined, which is the case for
both location and proximity-based contact tracing systems. Here, for proximity-based mobility data, we can
define a site ki,j for each pairwise interaction between individuals i and j.
2.2 Epidemiology
We build on recent variations of the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Resistant (SEIR) compartment models,
which have been introduced in the context of COVID-19 modeling [22, 25]. More specifically, we define the
epidemiological condition of each individual i ∈ V using the indicator state variables Si(t), Ei(t), Iai (t), Ipi (t),
Isi (t), Hi(t), Ri(t), Di(t) ∈ {0, 1}, whose meaning is specified in Table 1. Then, we characterize their values
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and state transitions using the following SDEs with jumps:
dSi(t) = −Si(t)dNi(t)
dEi(t) = dNi(t)− dMi(t)
dIai (t) = ai dMi(t)− dRai (t)
dIpi (t) = (1− ai) dMi(t)− dWi(t)
dIsi (t) = dWi(t)− (1− bi) dRsi (t)− bi dZi(t)
dRi(t) = ai dR
a
i (t) + (1− ai) dRsi (t)
dHi(t) = hi I
s
i (t) dYi(t)− (1− bi)Hi(t)dRsi (t)− biHi(t)dZi(t)
dDi(t) = bi dZi(t)
(3)
where ai ∈ {0, 1} ∼ Bernoulli(αa) indicates whether an infected individual i is asymptomatic, hi ∈ {0, 1} ∼
Bernoulli(αh) indicates whether a symptomatic individual i eventually requires hospitalization, and bi ∈
{0, 1} ∼ Bernoulli(αb) indicates whether a symptomatic individual eventually dies. The counting processes
Ni(t), Mi(t), Rai (t), Rsi (t), Wi(t), Yi(t), and Zi(t) model the state transitions of individual i from susceptible
to exposed (Ni(t)), from exposed to infected (Mi(t)), from presymptomatic infected to symptomatic infected
(Wi(t)), from asymptomatic infected to resistant (Rai (t)), from symptomatic infected to resistant (Rsi (t)),
from symptomatic infected to hospitalized (Yi(t)), and from symptomatic infected to dead (Zi(t)).
At the core of our modeling framework, we define the conditional intensity function λ∗i (t) of the exposure
counting process Ni(t) as
λ∗i (t) =
∑
k∈S
βkPi,k(t)
∑
j∈V\{i}
∫ t
t−δ
Kj,k(τ) e
−γ(t−τ) dτ (4)
where
Kj,k(τ) =
(
Isj (τ) + I
p
j (τ) + µI
a
j (τ)
)
Pj,k(τ)
and E[dNi(t)|H(t)] = λ∗i (t) dt. In the above, we have that
(i) βk ≥ 0 is the transmission rate due to presymptomatic and symptomatic individuals at site k.1
(ii) µ ∈ [0, 1] is the relative transmission rate of asymptomatic compared to (pre-)symptomatic individuals.
(iii)
∫ t
t−δKj,k(τ)e
−γ(t−τ) dτ accounts for environmental transmission, i.e., it accounts for the fact that the
virus may survive for some period of time on surfaces or in the air after an infected individual has left a
site [37].
Intuitively, the exposure intensity in Eq. 4 models that a given individual’s instantaneous rate of exposure
increases by a constant site-specific transmission rate βk when being in contact with another infectious
individual, in addition to capturing environmental transmission. Note that the exposure rate of each individual
i only depends on the individual’s contacts, not the contact of others. Infections within households can be
characterized straightforwardly by adding an additional additive rate λH(i)(t) with transmission ratet ξ to
the intensity λ∗i (t). Refer to Appendix A for more details.
We define the remaining time-to-event distributions of the disease-specific counting processes Mi(t), Rai (t),
Rsi (t), Wi(t), Yi(t), and Zi(t), which do not depend on the mobility model, following the recent literature on
COVID-19, as described in Appendix B and Table 2.
2.3 Containment measures
We can characterize a variety of containment measures at high spatiotemporal resolution. These may range
from less restrictive (e.g., isolating individuals who have tested positive) to more restrictive (e.g., implementing
1 Depending on the availability of labeled and unlabeled data, one may consider different settings, such as all sites sharing
the same parameter β or sites of the same category c sharing βc.
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Figure 1: Spatial distribution of site locations in the mobility model of Tübingen, Germany.
Circles depict schools, universities and research institutes (blue), social places (orange), bus stops (green),
workplaces (red), and supermarkets (purple).
a state of “lockdown” for the entire population via curfews). More specifically, the effect of social distancing
and quarantine can be faithfully characterized by reducing the rates λi,k(t) at which individuals visit sites in
the mobility model by a fraction p. The effect of business restrictions can be characterized by reducing (e.g.,
hygienic measures) or setting to zero (e.g., closures) the transmission rates βk of the sites individuals visits.
In both cases, the measures lead to a reduction of the conditional intensities λ∗i (t) of the exposure counting
processes Ni(t), possibly dynamically.
2.4 Testing
Our model maintains a queue Qtest of individuals to be tested. Over time, individuals are added to the queue
according to a testing policy pitest(t), e.g., testing only symptomatic or vulnerable people. Individuals from
the queue are tested at an arbitrary rate λtest(t), and every time an individual is tested, the outcome of the
test is only known after a reporting delay ∆test.
More formally, let T (t) record the number of known test outcomes by time t and, for each individual
i ∈ V, let T+i (t) and T−i (t) be the number of times the individual has been tested positive and negative,
respectively, by time t. Then, we can characterize the counting processes T+i (t) and T
−
i (t) using the following
SDEs with jumps:
dT+i (t) =
[
Ei(t)+I
a
i (t)+I
p
i (t)+I
s
i (t)
]
di(t) dT (t+∆test)
dT−i (t) =
[
Si(t)+Ri(t)
]
di(t) dT (t+∆test)
(5)
where E[dT (t)|H(t)] = λtest(t) dt and di(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∼ pitest(t) indicates whether an individual i is tested at
time t according to the policy.
2.5 Contact tracing
When an individual i is tested positive, a subset of individuals previously in contact with i could be
isolated or advised to seek testing. Under our model, a location-based contact tracing system records the
times when an individual i checks in at different sites k ∈ S, i.e., it observes Pi,k(t). Therefore, it can
identify the set of individuals C[t0,tf ](i) who had contact with individual i during a time window [t0, tf ]
at any possible site and also account for environmental transmissions. In contrast, a proximity-based
contact tracing system only records the times when a pair of individuals i and j have met, i.e., have been
physically close to each other, during a time window [t0, tf ]. For simplicity, we overload notation and define
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Pi,j(t) :=
∑
k∈S Pi,k(t)Pj,k(t) ∈ {0, 1} as the indicator of contact between individuals i and j. Observing
Pi,j(t), the authority can again identify the set of individuals C[t0,tf ](i) who had contact with individual i
during a time window [t0, tf ], however, it cannot account for environmental transmissions. To overcome this
limitation, the authority could resort to data from proximity-based contact tracing systems if Bluetooth
beacons are in place [38].
Once a contact tracing system has identified the contacts C[t0,tf ](i) of individual i, different contact tracing
policies can be implemented in various contexts. Amongst numerous strategies, we consider the possibility of
allocating tests based on the empirical exposure probability of contacts of an infectious person in this work,
which can be straightforwardly estimated using our framework. Refer to Appendices C and D for details.
3 Simulation and Parameter Estimation
3.1 Sampling algorithm
Given a fixed set of general individual mobility patterns Pi,k(t) and initial conditions Si(0), Ei(0), . . . ∀i ∈ V ,
we develop a sampling algorithm that simulates the state of each individual in the population over a time
window of interest [0, T ], potentially under social distancing measures, business restrictions, and a testing
and tracing strategy. The challenge here is that once individual i becomes infectious, their state changes to
one of Iai (t) = 1 or I
p
i (t) = 1, thereby changing the intensities λ
∗
j of the exposure counting processes Yj(t)
of other individuals j who have contact with i in the future. That means, previous timings sampled for Yj
might become invalid as the intensities of the counting processes change. As a result, sound simulations have
to apply the principles of superposition and thinning [32, 39] to generate valid samples of Yi(t) as infectious
states change over time. Refer to Appendix E for a detailed description of our algorithm.
3.2 Parameter estimation using Bayesian optimization
We use Bayesian optimization (BO) [35] to jointly estimate a set of exposure-related parameters θ that best fit
the longitudinal case data and were not specified from the literature. BO techniques provide sample-efficient
global optimization [33, 34], making them suitable for the computationally intensive simulations used in our
model. BO has been previously used for parameter estimation in expensive-to-evaluate models [40].
Bayesian optimization. In BO, a probabilistic surrogate model tracks the posterior p of the observed
black-box function f given a set of observed noisy evaluations D. As commonly done, we use a Gaussian
process (GP). New function evaluations are treated as observations used to update the posterior of the
objective. An acquisition function defined over the surrogate model guides the exploration-vs.-exploitation
strategy. At each iteration of the procedure, the acquisition function is cheaply optimized to determine the
next point of function evaluation [33, 41]. The function guides the search for an optimum, typically defined
such that high acquisition corresponds to high potential improvement of the objective.
Black-box simulator. We define the black-box functions observed from our simulator as the mean number
of positive cases at time t
gt(θ) = ET ∼T(θ)
 ∑
T+i ∈T
T+i (t)
 ≈ 1
J
J∑
j=1
∑
T+i ∈T (j)
T+i (t) (6)
where {T+i (t)} =: T (j) ∼ T(θ) ∀j are sets of state variables of positively tested that were independently
and randomly generated from the simulator T(θ) of our model. As indicated above, the expectation is
approximated using J independent random roll-outs using Monte Carlo integration. Hence, the observations
of functions gt(θ) are stochastic and can be seen as noisy. We use the mean number of positive cases of J
realizations to reduce the variance of function evaluations and be able to estimate its uncertainty. As a sum
of independent random variables, the function gt(θ) is normally distributed around the true expectation by
the central limit theorem. We can use the empirical standard error of the mean as an estimate of observation
noise in the surrogate model of gt.
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Our simulation T is stochastic not only due to different realizations of the counting processes, but in
absence of real observations also due to randomly seeded infection states and random synthetic mobility
traces Pi,k(t). The various sources of stochasticity can be viewed as a form of regularization during parameter
estimation, making the results more robust to different realizations of individual mobility patterns. Given
the above, the T stochastic black-box functions can be viewed as one stochastic vector-valued black-box
function g(θ) ∈ R|T | with g(θ)t := gt(θ). All T black-box functions gt share the same J random simulations
in practice.
Objective function. Given a time horizon of T days, the objective we aim to minimize in our setting is
the sum of daily squared errors of cumulative positive cases between simulations and real observations. This
allows us to form a link between the spatiotemporal states of each individual of the simulation and aggregate
longitudinal testing data. The squared error has been previously considered in parameter estimation [40].
Since BO algorithms usually consider the problem of global maximization, we negate our desired minimization
loss and define the score s(x) = −∑Tt=1(ctruet − xt)2 which we aim to maximize.
Let ctruet be the cumulative number of real positive COVID-19 cases by day t as provided by the national
authorities [42, 43]. Then, the objective f can be seen as a composition of the two functions s and g. Note
that, while the negative squared error score s is functionally known, the simulator g computes the mean
number of total positive cases across a time horizon as defined in Eq. 6 and viewed as a “black-box” function.
Hence, the composite objective f to be maximized can be written as
f(θ) = s
(
g(θ)
)
= −
T∑
t=1
(
ctruet − gt(θ)
)2
(7)
The fact that our objective f is a composite function of the score s and the high-dimensional g allows the
surrogate model to learn the black-box function g directly rather than the scalar objective f . By recognizing
and exploiting the compositionality of our black-box objective, we follow recent BO literature that has shown
immense practical advantages in explicitly modeling compositionality [40, 41].
Knowledge gradient acquisition function. Measurements of the objective f are inherently noisy using
our stochastic simulation. Thus, we employ the knowledge gradient (KG) [44, 45] acquisition function to
navigate the proposals of new parameter settings. KG quantifies the expected increase in the maximum of
the posterior mean of the modeled black-box function after an observation at a certain parameter setting of θ.
The KG of measuring at θ is formally defined as
KG(θ) := Ey∼p(g(θ) | D)
[
µ∗
(D ∪ {(θ,y)})− µ∗(D) ] (8)
µ∗(.) = max
θ′∈dom(θ)
E
[
s
(
g(θ′)
) ∣∣ . ] (9)
where µ∗(D ∪ {(θ,y)}) and µ∗(D) denote the maxima of the conditional means of the objective f given
the observations D under the surrogate model p, with the additional random observation (θ,y) in the first
term. Compared to simpler acquisition functions such as Expected Improvement, KG often shows improved
performance and is well-suited for settings with noisy observations [41, 46].
Overall estimation procedure. Our parameter estimation procedure follows the typical Bayesian opti-
mization paradigm of iterated cheap proposals and expensive function evaluations, repeatedly proposing
new parameters based on the GP surrogate model of the objective. The overall procedure is summarized in
Algorithm 3 of Appendix H. For proper initialization of the GP surrogate model and acquisition function, we
evaluate the model at the first M samples of the |θ| dimensional quasi-random Sobol sequence [47], obtaining
low-discrepancy points of initialization and giving the acquisition function an informative starting point. We
use the BoTorch library [41] to implement our procedure and to optimize the knowledge gradient.
4 Experimental Design
We showcase our modeling framework using data from both rural and urban areas in Germany and Switzerland
spanning a wide range of infection levels until today. More specifically, we experiment with two cities and
7
Tübingen Locarno Kaiserslautern Bern Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis Canton Jura
Figure 2: Cumulative number of cases for the models of the considered regions. The line represents
the mean cumulative number of positively tested individuals over 48 random realizations of the simulations,
the shaded regions correspond to two times the standard deviation. The dashed line represents the start of
the “lockdown” measures, and the black line the real observed cases. Averaged over days of simulation, the
mean absolute error (MAE) of predicted cases ranges between 10-30 cases across the six regions.
one district (Landkreis) in Germany – Tübingen, Kaiserslautern and the Landkreis of Rheingau-Taunus –
and two cities and one state (Canton) in Switzerland – Bern, Locarno, and the Canton of Jura; see Table 3.
In our experiments, we use the efficient sampling algorithm for our model derived in Appendix E to
simulate the spread of COVID-19 under a variety of interventions on two different epidemiological scenarios:
• Scenario A (Initially uncontrolled): Early stage of the outbreak. After a reaction delay, governments
aim to globally contain and suppress infections in the population. At the time of the interventions, there
is already a significant number of infected individuals. Contact tracing is usually not in place yet.
Setup: We simulate the spread of COVID-19 from the day when a given region had five to ten confirmed
cases, typically in early March, until the end of the “lockdown” period, the period of time when most
restrictive measures were in place.2 We use heuristically computed initially infected seeds and assume
that measures are in place only during the “lockdown” period, which starts approximately after two
weeks of uncontrolled spread. Refer to Appendix F for state initialization in this scenario.
• Scenario B (Continual suppression): Later stage of the epidemic. Measures taken by the govern-
ments have ended the first wave of infections. Local outbreaks occur due to imported cases, e.g., from
visits to other regions. Contact tracing and localized interventions are employed as fine-grained tools for
suppressing a resurgence of infections, i.e., a second wave.
Setup: We simulate the spread of COVID-19 for 120 days without reference to a specific date range
and assuming five untraceable background exposures per week per 100,000 inhabitants of a region in
expectation.
In the absence of individual mobility data, which may become available once contact tracing systems are
widely deployed, we generate realistic mobility traces Pi,k(t) for all individuals i ∈ V and sites k ∈ S in
each region using a variety of publicly available data sources, i.e., spatial distribution of site locations, as
exemplified by Figure 1, high-resolution population density data, country-specific information about household
structure [51, 52], and region-specific age demographics. Refer to Appendix G for additional details.
For each region, we estimate the transmission rates βk and ξ due to infectious individuals at the sites
they visit, in their households, as well as the mobility reduction p due to social distancing using Bayesian
optimization. As explained in Section 3, our parameter estimation procedure uses publicly available COVID-19
data of daily cases in country-level administrative regions from the entire period of time described in Scenario
A as its prediction target.3 To this end, we downscale the model and also simulate the corresponding
business restrictions and closures that were in place during the “lockdown” period. Refer to Appendix H
for additional information. To estimate the mortality and hospitalization rates per age group, we resort to
previous studies [21] and COVID-19 case data [42, 43].
2 This “lockdown” period started on March 23 and 16, 2020 and ended on May 3 and 10, 2020 in Germany and Switzerland,
respectively [48–50].
3For cities, cases are scaled proportionally to its population for lack of more available information.
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(a) Early ending “lockdown” (b) Alternating group curfews (c) Social distancing vulnerable groups
Figure 3: Number of infected people for the model of Tübingen under different counterfactual
what-if scenarios. In panel (a), we implement the same restrictive measures that were in place during the
“lockdown” period but reduce its length. In panel (b), the population is divided into K subgroups and, on
each day, only one group out of K is allowed to follow their usual daily activities. In panel (c), the population
over 60 years old follows the same social distancing measures that were in place during the “lockdown” period.
In all panels, the lines represent the mean of 48 random realizations of the simulations and the shaded regions
correspond to two times the standard deviation.
(a) Hospitalizations (b) Fatalities
Figure 4: Hospitalizations and fatalities for the model of Tübingen under social distancing of
vulnerable groups. In both panels, the lines represent the mean of 48 random realizations of the simulations
and the shaded regions correspond to two times the standard deviation.
Finally, to abstract away from variable testing criteria implemented in different regions, we assume that
only true symptomatic individuals are registered for testing unless stated otherwise and that the testing
queue follows the first-in-first-out principle. Tests are assumed to have perfect accuracy, and positively tested
individuals stop visiting sites and isolate themselves from their household members. Moreover, we set the
reporting delay ∆test to 48 hours, accounting for both the delay in self-reporting and the testing procedure
itself. The testing rate λtest(t) per day is set to the inverse of the maximum daily increase in positive cases in
the real observed COVID-19 data of the corresponding region.
5 Results
Using the estimated parameters βk, ξ and p, we first validate that our model is able to faithfully characterize
the observed real COVID-19 case data during the entire period of time described in Scenario A; see Figure 2.
Refer to Table 6 in the appendix for the estimated parameter values. The results show that our models can
consistently reproduce the overall longitudinal trend in real case data for all considered regions, and that
the parameters estimated using the downscaled models are a good fit for the full-scale models. Appendix I
discusses when parameter estimation using downscaled models might fail. Moreover, the results shown in
Figure 8 suggest that the social distancing measures and business restrictions imposed on the population
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Figure 5: Number of infected people in two single simulations of the model of Tübingen under
conditional “lockdowns” based on weekly incidence. Whenever the number of positive cases within 7
days exceeds the threshold of 50 per 100,000 inhabitants, we implement the same restrictive measures that
were in place during the “lockdown” period in Scenario A. Dashed and solid vertical lines indicate beginning
and ending of the conditional “lockdowns”, respectively.
during the lockdown period were effective in temporarily reducing Rt below the threshold of one both in
Germany and Switzerland, a necessary condition for the epidemic to come to a halt.
First, we investigate to what extent containment of the first wave of infections in Scenario A would have
been feasible using measures with lower impact on civil liberties and the economy. To this end, we explore
three counterfactual “what-if” scenarios that implement milder containment measures than those that were in
place during the “lockdown” period.
Early ending “lockdown”. We implement the same restrictive measures that were in place during the
“lockdown” period both in Germany and Switzerland but reduce the their duration. Figure 3a summarizes
the results for Tübingen and Figure 9 for all the considered towns and regions. The results suggest that, to
end the first wave of infections, it should have been sufficient to maintain the “lockdown” period for just one
month rather than two. However, they also show that a “lockdown” period of two weeks would be insufficient,
except for the notable exception of the Landkreis of Rheingau-Taunus.
Alternating curfews for random subgroups. We divide the population into K subgroups and, on each
day, we alternately prescribe curfews to K − 1 of the groups and only allow one group to follow their usual
daily activities. Figure 3b summarizes the results for Tübingen and Figure 10 for all the considered towns and
regions. The results suggest that, as long as the number of groups K > 2, this containment strategy would
be effective at reducing both intra- and inter-group exposure events, as argued by previous work [53, 54],
and the number of infected individuals would have followed a similar course as in the “lockdown” scenario.
However, for K = 2 groups, the results are mixed. In all the considered German towns and regions, the
strategy would still be relatively successful, however, in the Swiss city of Bern and the Canton of Jura, the
number of infected individuals would have constantly increased.
Social distancing of vulnerable groups. The population over 60 years old, who typically suffers more
complications from COVID-19 [42], follows the same social distancing measures that were in place during
the “lockdown” period and the rest of the population follows their usual daily activities. Figures 3c and 4
summarize the results for Tübingen and Figure 11 for all the considered towns and regions. As one may
have expected, the results suggest that this containment strategy would not end the first wave of infections.
However, they also show that it would only modestly reduce the number of hospitalizations and fatalities,
questioning the effectiveness of controversial policies that initially advocated for isolating only the people
who are most endangered.
Next, we focus on Scenario B and investigate the effectiveness of adaptive containment measures that utilize
testing and contact tracing to suppress a second wave of infections.
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Figure 6: Contact tracing for isolation and testing for the model of Tübingen. Panel (a) shows
the number of infected people whenever contact tracing is used for contact isolation and testing with different
reporting delays ∆test. Panel (b) shows the effective reproduction number Rt when contact tracing is used
for isolation and testing. Panel (c) shows the number of infected people for the same setting under different
levels of compliance. In panels (a) and (c), lines and shading indicate the mean and two times the standard
deviations over 48 random roll-outs. In panels (b) and (c), the reporting delay is set to ∆test = 48 hours. In
panel (b), the line represents the most likely estimate and shading represents high density areas.
Conditional “lockdowns” based on weekly incidence. Whenever the number of new cases within 7
days exceeds the threshold of 50 per 100,000 inhabitants, we implement the same restrictive measures that
were in place during the “lockdown” period in Scenario A. This has been the strategy in place in Germany
since May 6, 2020 [55]. Figure 5 shows the number of infected people over time during a single realization
for Tübingen. As shown in Figure 12, we found qualitatively similar results across realizations for all the
considered towns and regions. We observe that the repeated lifting of measures leads to fluctuations in the
number of infected individuals, but the short “lockdowns” are able to quickly reduce the number of new cases
below the desired threshold. While the typical length of the interventions is two weeks in Tübingen – with
intermittent unrestricted phases of similar duration – we find that, e.g., in Bern, case-conditional “lockdowns”
typically last for four weeks, with only three weeks without measures in between.
Contact tracing for isolation and testing. Whenever an individual is positively tested, we first use
contact tracing to identify all their contacts in the ten days leading up to the positive test result and isolate
them from everyone for 14 days, unless mentioned otherwise. We investigate to what extent the use of rapid
testing [56], i.e., we set ∆test to three hours, or further testing of contacts4 can increase the effectiveness of
the above basic strategy. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of the contact tracing for isolation and testing
under constraints on the compliance level and an advanced testing strategy. Figures 6 and 7 summarize
our results for Tübingen and Figures 13 and 14 for all considered towns and regions. In Figures 6a and 13,
we observe that the basic strategy, which only implements isolation of contacts, is already able to avoid a
significant resurgence in infections in all towns and regions. Moreover, the use of rapid tests and further
testing of contacts provide an additional reduction on the mean and variance of infection counts across
random roll-outs. Interestingly, under further testing of contacts, the number of infected people over time
reaches a steady state—the effective reproduction number Rt is pushed towards one, as shown in Figure 6b.
In Figure 6c, we observe that the effectiveness of contact tracing gradually degrades with lower compliance
due to the so-called “x2 problem” of adoption [22, 38], i.e., two parties needing to adopt contact tracing
technology for the infection chain to be tracked. In Appendix J, we analyze an alternative strategy to
identify contacts, called narrowcasting [57], which circumvents this problem. Finally, in Figures 7 and 14, we
observe that, when testing only the top 20 contacts ranked according to empirical probability of exposure of
Appendix D, it is possible to achieve the same reduction in infections as achieved when testing all contacts,
even though the overall number of tests is reduced by 70-90% (47,927 to 8,821 tests in Tübingen).
4Here, we assume that the testing capacity is high enough for every traced contact to be tested.
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Figure 7: Contact tracing for isolation with testing based on exposure risk. Whenever we test
only the top 20 contacts by their empirical probability of exposure as estimated from contact tracing, the
overall number of tests is reduced by 70-90%. Lines and shading indicate the mean and two times the
standard deviations over 48 random initializations.
6 Discussion
Motivated by the rapid development of contact tracing technology and the current COVID-19 outbreak, we
have introduced a spatiotemporal epidemic model that uses temporal point processes to represent individual
mobility patterns and the course of the disease for each individual in a population. Through an extensive
case study using real COVID-19 data and mobility patterns from several cities and regions in Germany and
Switzerland, we have shown that our model can be used to quantify the effects of contact tracing, testing,
and a variety of containment measures in two different epidemiological scenarios. Our results reveal both
qualitative and quantitative differences and similarities across geographically diverse areas spanning a wide
range of levels of transmission until today, and demonstrate that our model may allow individuals and
policy-makers to make more effective decisions. To facilitate this, we release an easy-to-use implementation
of the entire framework necessary to perform experiments for any desired region of the world.
Several countries are deploying contact tracing technology, however, contact tracing data is not accessible
to researchers as of today. Therefore, we have used geolocation data, high-resolution population density data,
country-specific information about household structure and region-specific age demographics to generate
realistic individual mobility traces. Once data from contact tracing technologies become accessible to
researchers, we believe that our predictions will have lower variance and it will be possible to use our
framework to identify areas with higher risk of infection in real time.
Beyond legal compliance and gaining societal acceptance, the use of epidemic models with high spatiotem-
poral resolution such as ours, as well as contact tracing technology, should respect each individual’s privacy.
In this context, it is important to highlight that, both during parameter estimation and contact tracing, we
only need to compute the duration of contact that each individual had with an infected person—the identity
of the infected person is not required. As a result, there are reasons to believe that such computations can be
made in a decentralized and privacy-preserving manner [58, 59].
Finally, although our model has significantly greater spatiotemporal resolution than many of those in use
today, we recommend to exercise caution when interpreting or using its results. Its predictions can only be
faithfully considered when being aware of the high variance observed across random realizations. We advise
against the implementation of testing and tracing strategies, social distancing measures, or business closures
based solely on the predictions made by our model.
12
Acknowledgements
We thank the Robert-Koch-Institute, OpenStreetMaps and Facebook for providing data to make this work
possible. We thank Brian Karrer from Facebook for his insightful comments and suggestions regarding
Bayesian optimization, and Yannik Schaelte for useful comments on a preliminary version of this work. We
thank Cansu Culha and the Stanford Future Bay Initiative as well as Pavol Harar from the University of
Vienna for working with us to improve our open-source implementation. This work was supported in part by
SNSF under grant number 200021-182407.
References
[1] “The COVID tracking project.” https://covidtracking.com/api/, 2020. [Online; accessed March
27, 2020].
[2] World Health Organization, “Coronavirus disease (COVID-2019) situation reports.” https://www.
who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/, 2020.
[Online; accessed March 27, 2020].
[3] “COVID Safe Paths.” http://safepaths.mit.edu, 2020. [Online; accessed July 30, 2020].
[4] “Zerobase – Privacy-First Contact Tracing for Communities.” http://zerobase.io, 2020. [Online;
accessed July 30, 2020].
[5] “DP3T - Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing.” https://github.com/DP-3T/documents,
2020. [Online; accessed July 30, 2020].
[6] Ministry of Health and Covernment Technology Agency, Singapore, “TraceTogether.” www.
tracetogether.gov.sg, 2020. [Online; accessed July 30, 2020].
[7] “Corona-Warn-App.” https://www.coronawarn.app/en/, 2020. [Online; accessed July 30, 2020].
[8] D. Bernoulli, “Essai d’une nouvelle analyse de la mortalité causée par la petite vérole, et des avantages
de l’inoculation pour la prévenir,” Histoire de l’Acad., Roy. Sci., 1760.
[9] K. Dietz and J. Heesterbeek, “Daniel Bernoulli’s epidemiological model revisited,” Mathematical bio-
sciences, 2002.
[10] W. Kermack and A. Mckendrick, “A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics,” Proc. R.
Soc, 2003.
[11] R. Ross et al., “An application of the theory of probabilities to the study of a priori pathometry. part i,”
Proc. R. Soc., 1916.
[12] R. Ross, H. P. Hudson, et al., “An application of the theory of probabilities to the study of a priori
pathometry. part iii,” Proc. R. Soc., 1917.
[13] H. J. Ahn and B. Hassibi, “Global dynamics of epidemic spread over complex networks,” in CDC, 2013.
[14] E. Cator and P. Van Mieghem, “Second-order mean-field susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemic
threshold,” Physical review E, 2012.
[15] D. Chakrabarti, Y. Wang, C. Wang, J. Leskovec, and C. Faloutsos, “Epidemic thresholds in real networks,”
ACM TISSEC, 2008.
[16] P. Van Mieghem, “The N-intertwined SIS epidemic network model,” Computing, 2011.
[17] P. Van Mieghem, J. Omic, and R. Kooij, “Virus spread in networks,” IEEE/ACM TON, 2009.
13
[18] S. Benzell, A. Collis, and C. Nicolaides, “Rationing social contact during the covid-19 pandemic:
Transmission risk and social benefits of us locations,” Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 2020.
[19] J. Dehning, J. Zierenberg, F. P. Spitzner, M. Wibral, J. P. Neto, M. Wilczek, and V. Priesemann,
“Inferring covid-19 spreading rates and potential change points for case number forecasts,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:2004.01105, 2020.
[20] L. Di Domenico, G. Pullano, P. Coletti, N. Hens, and V. Colizza, “Expected impact of school closure
and telework to mitigate covid-19 epidemic in france,” 2020.
[21] N. M. Ferguson, D. Laydon, G. Nedjati-Gilani, N. Imai, K. Ainslie, M. Baguelin, S. Bhatia, A. Boonyasiri,
Z. Cucunubá, G. Cuomo-Dannenburg, et al., “Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (npis) to
reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand,” London: Imperial College COVID-19 Response
Team, March, vol. 16, 2020.
[22] L. Ferretti, C. Wymant, M. Kendall, L. Zhao, A. Nurtay, D. G. Bonsall, and C. Fraser, “Quantifying
dynamics of sars-cov-2 transmission suggests that epidemic control and avoidance is feasible through
instantaneous digital contact tracing,” Science, 2020.
[23] R. Herbrich, R. Rastogi, and R. Vollgraf, “Crisp: A probabilistic model for individual-level covid-19
infection risk estimation based on contact data,” 2020.
[24] A. J. Kucharski, P. Klepac, A. J. K. Conlan, S. M. Kissler, M. L. Tang, H. Fry, J. R. Gog, W. J.
Edmunds, J. C. Emery, G. Medley, J. D. Munday, T. W. Russell, Q. J. Leclerc, C. Diamond, S. R.
Procter, A. Gimma, F. Y. Sun, H. P. Gibbs, A. Rosello, K. van Zandvoort, S. HuÃ c©, S. R. Meakin,
A. K. Deol, G. Knight, T. Jombart, A. M. Foss, N. I. Bosse, K. E. Atkins, B. J. Quilty, R. Lowe, K. Prem,
S. Flasche, C. A. B. Pearson, R. M. G. J. Houben, E. S. Nightingale, A. Endo, D. C. Tully, Y. Liu,
J. Villabona-Arenas, K. O’Reilly, S. Funk, R. M. Eggo, M. Jit, E. M. Rees, J. Hellewell, S. Clifford,
C. I. Jarvis, S. Abbott, M. Auzenbergs, N. G. Davies, and D. Simons, “Effectiveness of isolation, testing,
contact tracing, and physical distancing on reducing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in different settings: a
mathematical modelling study,” The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2020. Publisher: Elsevier.
[25] R. Li, S. Pei, B. Chen, Y. Song, T. Zhang, W. Yang, and J. Shaman, “Substantial undocumented
infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel Coronavirus (SARS-CoV2),” Science, 2020.
[26] Q. Lin, S. Zhao, D. Gao, Y. Lou, S. Yang, S. S. Musa, M. H. Wang, Y. Cai, W. Wang, L. Yang, et al., “A
conceptual model for the coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19) outbreak in wuhan, china with individual
reaction and governmental action,” International journal of infectious diseases, vol. 93, pp. 211–216,
2020.
[27] S. M. Moghadas, A. Shoukat, M. C. Fitzpatrick, C. R. Wells, P. Sah, A. Pandey, J. D. Sachs, Z. Wang,
L. A. Meyers, B. H. Singer, et al., “Projecting hospital utilization during the covid-19 outbreaks in the
united states,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2020.
[28] B. Vermeulen, A. Pyka, and M. Müller, “An agent-based policy laboratory for COVID-19 containment
strategies.” https://inno.uni-hohenheim.de/corona-modell, 2020. [Online; accessed April
14, 2020].
[29] C. R. Wells, P. Sah, S. M. Moghadas, A. Pandey, A. Shoukat, Y. Wang, Z. Wang, L. A. Meyers, B. H.
Singer, and A. P. Galvani, “Impact of international travel and border control measures on the global
spread of the novel 2019 coronavirus outbreak,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117,
no. 13, pp. 7504–7509, 2020.
[30] A. L. Bertozzi, E. Franco, G. Mohler, M. B. Short, and D. Sledge, “The challenges of modeling and
forecasting the spread of covid-19,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117, no. 29,
pp. 16732–16738, 2020.
14
[31] A. Aleta, D. MartÃn-Corral, A. Pastore y Piontti, M. Ajelli, M. Litvinova, M. Chinazzi, N. E. Dean, M. E.
Halloran, I. M. Longini Jr, S. Merler, A. Pentland, A. Vespignani, E. Moro, and Y. Moreno, “Modelling
the impact of testing, contact tracing and household quarantine on second waves of COVID-19,” Nature
Human Behaviour, Aug. 2020.
[32] A. De, U. Upadhyay, and M. Gomez-Rodriguez, “Temporal point processes,” tech. rep., Technical report,
Saarland University, 2019.
[33] E. Brochu, V. M. Cora, and N. de Freitas, “A tutorial on bayesian optimization of expensive cost
functions, with application to active user modeling and hierarchical reinforcement learning,” 2010.
[34] D. R. Jones, M. Schonlau, and W. J. Welch, “Efficient global optimization of expensive black-box
functions,” Journal of Global optimization, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 455–492, 1998.
[35] J. Snoek, H. Larochelle, and R. P. Adams, “Practical bayesian optimization of machine learning algorithms,”
in Advances in neural information processing systems, pp. 2951–2959, 2012.
[36] L. Lorch, H. Kremer, W. Trouleau, S. Tsirtsis, A. Szanto, B. Schölkopf, and M. Gomez-Rodriguez,
“Data and code from “Quantifying the Effects of Contact Tracing, Testing, and Containment Measures”.”
https://github.com/covid19-model, 2020. [Online; accessed July 24, 2020].
[37] N. van Doremalen, T. Bushmaker, D. Morris, M. Holbrook, A. Gamble, B. Williamson, A. Tamin,
J. Harcourt, N. Thornburg, S. Gerber, J. Lloyd-Smith, E. de Wit, and V. Munster, “Aerosol and surface
stability of HCoV-19 (SARS-CoV-2) compared to SARS-CoV-1,” medRxiv, 2020.
[38] J. Langford, “Critical issues in digital contract tracing,” 2020.
[39] O. O. Aalen, Ø. Borgan, and H. K. Gjessing, Survival and Event History Analysis. Springer New York,
2008.
[40] R. Astudillo and P. I. Frazier, “Bayesian optimization of composite functions,” 2019.
[41] M. Balandat, B. Karrer, D. R. Jiang, S. Daulton, B. Letham, A. G. Wilson, and E. Bakshy, “Botorch:
Programmable bayesian optimization in pytorch,” 2019.
[42] Robert Koch-Institut (RKI), dl-de/by-2-0, “RKI COVID19 data set.” https://
npgeo-corona-npgeo-de.hub.arcgis.com/datasets/, 2020. [Online; accessed July 13,
2020].
[43] Bundesamt für Gesundheit, Schweiz, “BAG COVID19 situation sum-
mary.” https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/krankheiten/
ausbrueche-epidemien-pandemien/aktuelle-ausbrueche-epidemien/novel-cov/
situation-schweiz-und-international.html, 2020. [Online; accessed July 13, 2020].
[44] P. I. Frazier, W. B. Powell, and S. Dayanik, “A knowledge-gradient policy for sequential information
collection,” SIAM J. Control Optim., vol. 47, p. 2410–2439, Sept. 2008.
[45] J. Wu and P. Frazier, “The parallel knowledge gradient method for batch bayesian optimization,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 29 (D. D. Lee, M. Sugiyama, U. V. Luxburg,
I. Guyon, and R. Garnett, eds.), pp. 3126–3134, Curran Associates, Inc., 2016.
[46] P. I. Frazier, “A tutorial on bayesian optimization,” 2018.
[47] I. Sobol, “On the distribution of points in a cube and the approximate evaluation of integrals,” USSR
Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 86 – 112, 1967.
15
[48] Land Baden-Württemberg, “Verordnung der Landesregierung über infektionsschützende
Massnahmen gegen die Ausbreitung des Virus SARS-Cov-2 (Corona-Verordnung).”
https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/service/aktuelle-infos-zu-corona/
aktuelle-corona-verordnung-des-landes-baden-wuerttemberg/, 2020. [Online; accessed
April 14, 2020].
[49] Bundesländer der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, “Corona-Regelungen in den Bun-
desländern.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/coronavirus/
corona-bundeslaender-1745198, 2020. [Online; accessed July 09, 2020].
[50] Der Schweizerische Bundesrat, “Verordnung 2 über Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung des
Coronavirus (COVID-19) (COVID-19-Verordnung 2).” https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/
classified-compilation/20200744/index.html, 2020. [Online; accessed July 09, 2020].
[51] Statistisches Bundesamt, Deutschland, “Households, by type of household. Long-term series with
annual data from 1961..” https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/
Population/Households-Families/Tables/lrbev05.html, 2020. [Online; accessed May 16,
2020].
[52] Bundesamt für Statistik, Schweiz, “Households.” https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/
statistiken/bevoelkerung/stand-entwicklung/haushalte.html, 2020. [Online; accessed
May 16, 2020].
[53] O. Karin, Y. M. Bar-On, T. Milo, I. Katzir, A. Mayo, Y. Korem, B. Dudovich, E. Yashiv, A. J. Zehavi,
N. Davidovich, et al., “Adaptive cyclic exit strategies from lockdown to suppress covid-19 and allow
economic activity,” medRxiv, 2020.
[54] D. Meidan, R. Cohen, S. Haber, and B. Barzel, “An alternating lock-down strategy for sustainable
mitigation of covid-19,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.01453, 2020.
[55] Bundesregierung Deutschland, “Telefonschaltkonferenz der Bundeskanzlerin mit den Regierungschefinnen
und Regierungschefs der Länder am 6. Mai 2020.” https://www.bundesregierung.
de/resource/blob/973812/1750986/fc61b6eb1fc1d398d66cfea79b565129/
2020-05-06-mpk-beschluss-data.pdf, 2020. [Online; accessed July 18, 2020].
[56] European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, “An overview of the rapid test situation for
COVID-19 diagnosis in the eu/eea.” https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
documents/Overview-rapid-test-situation-for-COVID-19-diagnosis-EU-EEA.pdf,
2020. [Online; accessed July 18, 2020].
[57] J. Chan, S. Gollakota, E. Horvitz, J. Jaeger, S. Kakade, T. Kohno, J. Langford, J. Larson, S. Singanamalla,
J. Sunshine, et al., “Pact: Privacy sensitive protocols and mechanisms for mobile contact tracing,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:2004.03544, 2020.
[58] M. Nanni, G. Andrienko, C. Boldrini, F. Bonchi, C. Cattuto, F. Chiaromonte, G. Comandé, M. Conti,
M. Coté, F. Dignum, V. Dignum, J. Domingo-Ferrer, F. Giannotti, R. Guidotti, D. Helbing, J. Kertesz,
S. Lehmann, B. Lepri, P. Lukowicz, A. Monreale, K. Morik, N. Oliver, A. Passarella, A. Passerini,
D. Pedreschi, A. Pentland, F. Pratesi, S. Rinzivillo, S. Ruggieri, A. Siebes, R. Trasarti, J. van den Hoven,
and A. Vespignani, “Give more data, awareness and control to individual citizens, and they will help
COVID-19 containment,” 2020.
[59] C. Troncoso et al., “Decentralized privacy-preserving proximity tracing.” https://github.com/
DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf, 2020. [Online; accessed April
14, 2020].
16
[60] S. A. Lauer, K. H. Grantz, Q. Bi, F. K. Jones, Q. Zheng, H. R. Meredith, A. S. Azman, N. G. Reich, and
J. Lessler, “The Incubation Period of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported
Confirmed Cases: Estimation and Application,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 2020.
[61] N. M. Linton, T. Kobayashi, Y. Yang, K. Hayashi, A. R. Akhmetzhanov, S.-m. Jung, B. Yuan, R. Ki-
noshita, and H. Nishiura, “Incubation period and other epidemiological characteristics of 2019 novel
Coronavirus infections with right truncation: A statistical analysis of publicly available case data,”
Journal of Clinical Medicine, vol. 9, no. 2, 2020.
[62] Robert Koch-Institut (RKI), “Epidemiologisches Bulletin des Robert Koch-Instituts (Aus-
gabe 15/2020).” https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/EpidBull/Archiv/2020/Ausgaben/15_20.pdf?
__blob=publicationFile, 2020. [Online; accessed April 13, 2020].
[63] H. Nishiura, T. Kobayashi, T. Miyama, A. Suzuki, S. Jung, K. Hayashi, R. Kinoshita, Y. Yang, B. Yuan,
A. R. Akhmetzhanov, and N. M. Linton, “Estimation of the asymptomatic ratio of novel coronavirus
infections (covid-19),” medRxiv, 2020.
[64] E. Lavezzo, E. Franchin, C. Ciavarella, G. Cuomo-Dannenburg, L. Barzon, C. Del Vecchio, L. Rossi,
R. Manganelli, A. Loregian, N. Navarin, D. Abate, M. Sciro, S. Merigliano, E. Decanale, M. C. Vanuzzo,
F. Saluzzo, F. Onelia, M. Pacenti, S. Parisi, G. Carretta, D. Donato, L. Flor, S. Cocchio, G. Masi,
A. Sperduti, L. Cattarino, R. Salvador, K. A. Gaythorpe, A. R. Brazzale, S. Toppo, M. Trevisan, V. Baldo,
C. A. Donnelly, N. M. Ferguson, I. Dorigatti, and A. Crisanti, “Suppression of covid-19 outbreak in the
municipality of vo, italy,” medRxiv, 2020.
[65] L. Tindale, M. Coombe, J. E. Stockdale, E. Garlock, W. Y. V. Lau, M. Saraswat, Y.-H. B. Lee, L. Zhang,
D. Chen, J. Wallinga, and C. Colijn, “Transmission interval estimates suggest pre-symptomatic spread of
covid-19,” medRxiv, 2020.
[66] World Health Organization, “Report of the who-china joint mission on Coronavirus dis-
ease 2019 (covid-19).” https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/
who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf, 2020. [Online; accessed April
12, 2020].
[67] “Facebook Data for Good.” https://dataforgood.fb.com, 2020. [Online; accessed July 27, 2020].
[68] “OpenStreetMap.” https://www.openstreetmap.org/, 2020. [Online; accessed August 5, 2020].
[69] L. M. A. Bettencourt and R. M. Ribeiro, “Real time bayesian estimation of the epidemic potential of
emerging infectious diseases,” PLOS ONE, vol. 3, pp. 1–9, 05 2008.
[70] K. Systrom, “Estimating covid-19’s rt in real-time.” https://github.com/k-sys/covid-19, 2020.
[71] X. He, E. H. Y. Lau, P. Wu, X. Deng, J. Wang, X. Hao, Y. C. Lau, J. Y. Wong, Y. Guan, X. Tan, X. Mo,
Y. Chen, B. Liao, W. Chen, F. Hu, Q. Zhang, M. Zhong, Y. Wu, L. Zhao, F. Zhang, B. J. Cowling, F. Li,
and G. M. Leung, “Temporal dynamics in viral shedding and transmissibility of COVID-19,” Nature
Medicine, vol. 26, pp. 672–675, May 2020.
[72] R. Woelfel, V. M. Corman, W. Guggemos, M. Seilmaier, S. Zange, M. A. Mueller, D. Niemeyer, P. Vollmar,
C. Rothe, M. Hoelscher, T. Bleicker, S. Bruenink, J. Schneider, R. Ehmann, K. Zwirglmaier, C. Drosten,
and C. Wendtner, “Clinical presentation and virological assessment of hospitalized cases of Coronavirus
disease 2019 in a travel-associated transmission cluster,” medRxiv, 2020.
[73] D. Wang, B. Hu, C. Hu, F. Zhu, X. Liu, J. Zhang, B. Wang, H. Xiang, Z. Cheng, Y. Xiong, Y. Zhao,
Y. Li, X. Wang, and Z. Peng, “Clinical Characteristics of 138 Hospitalized Patients With 2019 Novel
Coronavirus-Infected Pneumonia in Wuhan, China,” JAMA, vol. 323, no. 11, pp. 1061–1069, 2020.
17
A Household infections
If information about the households H(i) that each individual i ∈ V belongs to is available, then one can
account for infections within the households by adding the following base rate λH(i)(t) to the conditional
intensity function λ∗i (t) of the exposure counting process Ni(t):
λH(i)(t) = ξ
∑
j∈H(t)\i
∫ t
t−δ
(Isj (τ) + I
p
j (τ) + µI
a(τ)) e−γ(t−τ)
∏
k∈S
(1− Pi,k(τ))
∏
k∈S
(1− Pj,k(τ)) dτ (10)
where ξ ≥ 0 is the transmission rate due to any presymptomatic and symptomatic individuals within
households. This functional form of intensity function models our assumption that individuals within a
household are in contact as long as they are not visiting any site.
Exposure events caused by the household exposure rate λH(i)(t) can be sampled analogously to the
principles for sampling exposure times introduced in Appendix E, and their superposition with exposures at
sites is handled correspondingly by the priority queue invariant.
B Disease-specific time-to-event distributions
We define the time-to-event distributions of the disease-specific counting processes Mi(t), Rai (t), Rsi (t), Wi(t),
Yi(t), and Zi(t), which do not depend on the mobility model, following the recent literature on COVID-19.
More specifically, we consider the functional form of the intensity functions to be those of log-normal time-to-
event distributions (logN ) shifted to start at the time Ei(t), Ipi (t), Iai (t) or Isi (t) become one, respectively.
Table 2 gives more details about each of these distributions, including the specific work which we refer to for
the distribution parameters. Whenever literature results on COVID-19 were only reported using mean or
median estimates of times, we use log-normal distributions with corresponding normal parameters to define
an approximate distribution, often consulting various sources. The log-normal distribution is commonly used
to model event times in this context [60, 61].
C Contact tracing
When an individual i is tested positive, a subset of individuals previously in contact with i could be isolated
or advised to seek testing. Under our model, the set of individuals C[t0,tf ](i) who had contact with individual
i during a time window [t0, tf ] at any possible site can be traced by both location-based and proximity-based
tracing systems. A location-based contact tracing system records the times when an individual i checks in at
different sites k ∈ S, i.e., it observes Pi,k(t). Therefore, it can identify the set of individuals C[t0,tf ](i) who
had contact with individual i during a time window [t0, tf ] at any possible site, i.e.
C[t0,tf ](i) =
{
j ∈ V
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈S
∫ tf
t0
Pi,k(t
′)
∫ t′
t′−δ
Pj,k(τ)e
−γ(t′−τ) dτ dt′ > 0
}
(11)
where the integral accounts for environmental transmission contacts at each site [37], analogous to the
exposure rate λ∗.
By contrast, a proximity-based contact tracing system only records the times when a pair of individuals i
and j have met, i.e., have been physically close to each other, during a time window [t0, tf ]. For simplicity,
we overload notation and define Pi,j(t) :=
∑
k∈S Pi,k(t)Pj,k(t) ∈ {0, 1} as the indicator of contact between
individuals i and j. Observing Pi,j(t), the authority can again identify the set of individuals C[t0,tf ](i) who
had contact with individual i during a time window [t0, tf ], i.e.
C[t0,tf ](i) =
{
j ∈ V
∣∣∣∣ ∫ tf
t0
Pi,j(t
′) dt′ > 0
}
(12)
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where in contrast with Eq. 11 environmental transmission contacts cannot be tracked. Authorities could
in principle resort to data from Bluetooth beacons to overcome this limitation of proximity-based contact
tracing systems [38].
D Testing based on empirical probability of exposure
Once a contact tracing system has identified the contacts C[t0,tf ](i) of individual i, different contact tracing
policies can be implemented in various contexts. In this work, we consider the possibility of allocating tests
based on the empirical exposure probability of contacts of an infectious person, which can be straightforwardly
estimated using our framework. We define the empirical risk testing policy pirisktest as the allocation of tests
only to the top K individuals j of the contacts C[t0,tf ](i) ranked by their empirical probability of exposure
pˆj←i([t0, tf ]) during a time window [t0, tf ] associated with i in the process Nj(t):
pˆj←i([t0, tf ]) =

1− exp
(
−
∑
k∈S
∫ tf
t0
Pj,k(t
′)
∫ t′
t′−δ
Pi,k(τ)e
−γ(t′−τ) dτ dt′
)
location-based tracing
1− exp
(
−
∫ tf
t0
Pi,j(t
′) dt′
)
proximity-based tracing
(13)
where the notation is overloaded for proximity-based tracing. While the isolation of contacts via tracing is
generally not capacity-constrained, testing resources are often initially limited in practice [62]. Hence, we
study the empirical effect of this advanced testing policy in our experiments. Disregarding second order
effects and inaccuracies in estimating the empirical probability of exposure, the empirical risk testing policy
can be interpreted as a greedy allocation of tests under limited resources. We leave the consideration of more
sophisticated contact tracing policies for future work.
E Sampling algorithm
In this section, we describe how to generate realizations of the model by implementing the principles of
superposition and thinning [32, 39] efficiently in a global context using one single priority queue of temporal
events for all individuals in the model. The resulting sampling procedure is summarized as Algorithms 1
and 2.
E.1 Algorithmic backbone
First, note that the state variables S(t) = {Si(t), Ei(t), Iai (t), Ipi (t), Isi (t), Hi(t), Ri(t), Di(t)}i∈V in the
SDEs of the model change at – and only change at – jumps of the counting processes C(t) = {Ni(t), Mi(t),
Rai (t), Rsi (t), Wi(t), Yi(t), Zi(t)}i∈V . Since these state transitions happen at specific points in continuous
time, notice that all state variables S(t) are constant between two consecutive jumps, when considering all
arrival times of all counting processes C(t) on one timeline in temporally sorted order. This leads us to the
backbone principle for generating realizations of our model. We initialize the state variables S(0), compute
the next time of state transition for each individual i ∈ V, and push these transition events onto one single
temporally-sorted priority queue Q. Then, the algorithm loops repeatedly through (i) popping the next event
e from Q; (ii) updating the corresponding state of individual i associated with e; (iii) sampling the next time
t of state transition e′ for i; and (iv) pushing e′ to Q with prioirity t.
What remains to be shown is how to sample the state transition times for individual i given the state
S(t) of everyone in the population. As explained in the model section of the paper, we fix the time-to-
event distributions of all non-exposure related processes C(t)\{Ni(t)}i∈V to independent, easy-to-sample
distributions that were estimated by clinical COVID-19 literature. Hence, sampling the times of exposure
Ni(t) remains the central difficulty, as the intensities λ∗i (t) of the counting processes are interacting with all
other state variables S(t) through the mobility model Pi,k(t).
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Algorithm 1 Sampling algorithm for model simulation
Input: Initial state variables at t = 0, location traces Pi,k(t), parameters γ, δ, αa, αb, αh, µ and βk, hazard functions λ_(t)
1: tnow ← 0, Si ← 1, Q← priority queue processing in temporal order of events
2: for all i ∈ V s.t. Si = 0 do
3: Push next state transition (0,_, i,∅) to Q (see below)
4: while Q not empty do
5: (tnow, e, i, j, k)← pop earliest from Q . Event is (time of event, transition, i, infector, site)
6: if e is dE and Rj(tnow) = 0 and Dj(tnow) = 0 and Si = 1 then . Person i exposed by infector j
7: if Interventions(i, j, k, tnow) then
8: Call Algorithm 2 with arguments (P, j, i, tnow, r = 1− (1− µ)Iaj (tnow)) . Reject and re-sample
9: else
10: Ei ← 1, Si ← 0, ∆M ∼ Expo(λM (tnow)) , u ∼ Unif(0, 1)
11: if u ≤ αa then
12: Push (tnow + ∆M , dIa, i,∅) event to Q
13: else
14: Push (tnow + ∆M , dIp, i,∅) event to Q
15: else if e is dIp then . Person i pre-symptomatic
16: Ipi ← 1, Ei ← 0, ∆Z ∼ Expo(λW (tnow))
17: Push (tnow + ∆W , dIs, i,∅) event to Q
18: for u such that Su = 1 do
19: Call Algorithm 2 with arguments (P, i, u, tnow, r = 1)
20: else if e is dIs then . Person i symptomatic
21: Isi ← 1, Ipi ← 0, u, v ∼ Unif(0, 1)
22: if u ≤ αh then
23: ∆Y ∼ Expo(λY (tnow)), Push (tnow + ∆Y , dH, i,∅)
24: if v ≤ αb then
25: ∆Z ∼ Expo(λZ(tnow)), Push (tnow + ∆Z , dD, i,∅) event to Q
26: else
27: ∆R ∼ Expo(λRs (tnow)), Push (tnow + ∆R, dR, i,∅) event to Q
28: else if e is dIa then . Person i asymptomatic
29: Iai ← 1, Ei ← 0, ∆R ∼ Expo(λRa (tnow))
30: Push (tnow + ∆R, dR, i,∅) event to Q
31: for u such that Su = 1 do
32: Call Algorithm 2 with arguments (P, i, u, tnow, r = µ)
33: else if e is dH then . Person i hospitalized
34: Hi ← 1
35: else if e is dR then . Person i resistant
36: Ri ← 1, Iai ← 0, Isi ← 0, Hi ← 0
37: else if e is dD then . Person i deceased
38: Di ← 1, Isi ← 0, Hi ← 0
E.2 Sampling exposure times
To sample the time of exposure of individual i, we need to sample the time-to-event of the next event of
exposure counting process Ni(t) with intensity λ∗i (t). To this end, we first decompose the intensity λ∗i (t) into
a sum of contributions λ∗j→i(t) caused by other individuals j:
λ∗i (t) =
∑
k∈S
βkPi,k(t)
∑
j∈V\{i}
∫ t
t−δ
Kj,k(τ)e
−γ(t−τ) dτ =
∑
j∈V\{i}
∑
k∈S
βkPi,k(t)
∫ t
t−δ
Kj,k(τ)e
−γ(t−τ) dτ
=:
∑
j∈V\{i}
λ∗j→i(t),
(14)
where note the last summation over j ∈ V\{i} is sparse as it effectively indexes over contacts of individuals i
at times in the future, since λ∗j→i(t) = 0 when i and j are not in contact directly or j left site k ∈ S more
than δ-time before i arrived.
By the decomposition of Ni(t) above, the counting process Ni(t) can be seen as a superposition of counting
processes Nj→i(t) with rates λ∗j→i(t), i.e. that Ni(t) =
∑
j∈V\{i}Nj→i(t). This implies that the first arrival
20
Algorithm 2 Pushes next event of individual i exposing individual j in time window [t, T ]. This procedure
considers the contribution λ∗i→j(t) in Eq. 14 of individual i to rate λ∗j (t) alone. Implements thinning as
described in Appendix E to obtain sound time-to-event sample τ of counting process with rate λ∗i→j(t).
Priority queue Q induces superposition to obtain a correct sample of Nj(t) in Algorithm 1.
Input: P , i, j, t, r
1: procedure InContact(u, v, τ)
2: return True if ∃k ∈ S s.t. (1) Pu,k(τ) = 1 and (2) ∃τ ′ ∈ [τ − δ, τ ] s.t. Pv,k(τ ′) = 1 else return False
3: procedure ContactSite(u, v, τ)
4: return k if ∃k ∈ S s.t. (1) Pu,k(τ) = 1 and (2) ∃τ ′ ∈ [τ − δ, τ ] s.t. Pv,k(τ ′) = 1 else return ∅
5: procedure NextContact(u, v, τ)
6: return minτ ′>τ τ ′ s.t. InContact(u, v, τ ′)
7: procedureWillBeInContact(u, v, τ)
8: return True if there exists τ ′ ∈ [τ, T ] s.t. InContact(u, v, τ ′) else return False
9: τ ← t
10: whileWillBeInContact(j, i, τ) do
11: b← InContact(j, i, τ)
12: if not b then
13: τ ← NextContact(j, i, τ)
14: ∆Ej ∼ Expo
(
maxk{βk} r
∫ τ
τ−δ e
−γ(τ−v)dv
)
15: τ ← τ + ∆Ej
16: if InContact(j, i, τ) then
17: k ← ContactSite(j, i, τ)
18: p←
(
βk
∫ τ
τ−δ e
−γ(τ−v)Pi,k(v)dv
)/(
maxk{βk}
∫ τ
τ−δ e
−γ(τ−v)dv
)
19: u ∼ Unif(0, 1)
20: if u ≤ p then
21: Push (τ, dE, j, i) event to Q
22: break
of the counting process Ni(t) is the minimum of the first arrivals of all processes Nj→i(t) [32, 39]. Then, as
we already have the temporally-sorted priority queue Q in place, we can use its ordering invariant to process
the valid exposure events of individuals on the fly. Whenever any individual j becomes infectious – either
via Iaj = 1 or I
p
j = 1 – we sample the next exposure event that j causes at rate λ
∗
j→i(t) for every individual
i which j will have contact with in the future, and push this event onto the priority queue Q. When an
exposure event e for individual i is popped off the queue in step (i), we only have to check that e is the first
exposure event of i in the simulation by verifying that Si(t) = 0, discarding all subsequent exposure events
for i that get popped from Q by finding Si(t) = 1.
Moreover, to sample the first time to event for each counting process Nj→i(t), we use the principles
of superposition and thinning [32, 39] as well as the memoryless property of the exponential distribution.
The intensity λ∗j→i(t) only has intervals of non-zero rate whenever j has infectious contact with i, either by
meeting i at a site k ∈ S directly or by leaving less than δ-time before i arrives. Note that an upper bound
on the individual exposure intensity is supt∈[0,T ] λ∗j→i(t) = maxk∈S{βk(1 − exp(−γδ))/γ} =: λ∗j→i,max by
Eq. 14. Thus, we can sample the next event time after time t by initializing t′ = t and repeating the following
two steps until the first acceptance of t′: (i) add τ ∼ Expo(λ∗j→i,max) to t′; (ii) accept with probability
λ∗j→i(t
′)/λ∗j→i,max. By the process called thinning, t′ is a sound random sample of the time to the next event
of N∗j→i(t) [32].
The procedure is made more efficient by skipping over periods of λ∗j→i(t) = 0 whenever t in the above
sampling loop reaches a zero-rate window in step (ii), which is sound by viewing the process Nj→i(t) itself as
a superposition of sub-processes, one for each non-zero interval of intensity, and skipping the initial zero-rate
period of sampling from such a sub-process by the memoryless property of the exponential distribution.5
5If T ∼ Expo(λ), then P (T ≥ t+ s | T ≥ s) = P (T ≥ t).
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E.3 Thinning
While the above handles all exposures caused by individuals that become infectious, it can happen that an
infectious individual j has recovered from COVID-19 at the time an exposure event e caused by j for another
person is popped off the queue Q. Note that if j recovers, i.e. Rj(t) = 1, then λ∗j→i(t) = 0 in Eq. 14 for the
exposure event that was added to Q earlier in the simulation when λ∗j→i(t) > 0. Such an exposure event e
simply has to be discarded by the principle of thinning, which can be easily checked on the fly by verifying
that Rj(t) 6= 1 at the time of event e.
Lastly, note that interventional measures such as social distancing – sparsifying Pi,k(t) – or business
restrictions – reducing βk – always reduce the original exposure rates λ∗j→i(t) in Eq. 14, and can thus be
implemented in a straightforward manner using thinning by rejecting affected exposure events with some
probability.
E.4 Queue-based sampling algorithm
Combining our considerations above, we arrive at an efficient sampling procedure based on a single temporally-
sorted priority queue Q for generating sound simulations of the model SDEs. The comprehensive algorithm
is defined as Algorithm 1 and the sampling of exposure times explicitly described in Algorithm 2. For
simplicity, we omit details about the procedure Interventions(i, j, k, t), which applies the above-mentioned
thinning due to social distancing and business restrictions, and point the reader to our publicly available
implementation for details [36].
F State variable initialization
While background exposures in Scenario B are straightforwardly modeled by adding a constant base rate
λ∗0,i(t) to λ∗i (t) in the exposure counting processes Ni(t) (e.g., modelling visits to neighboring regions), there
need to be non-degenerate initial conditions when modeling Scenario A and for parameter estimation during
the same period. Since COVID-19 case data is available during this time window, we decide to heuristically
compute aggregate initial seed counts for the state variables using the observed cases as well as results from
recent COVID-19 literature. The starting point of Scenario A is selected such that approximately five to ten
COVID-19 cases occurred in a given region.
Specifically, we set the number of initially symptomatic individuals Isinit =
∑
i∈V I
s(0) equal to the real
observed COVID-19 cases in a region, or scaled proportionally to the population size within an administrative
region, at the start date of simulation and assume that all have been positively tested. Based on the above,
we initially seed Iainit = αa/(1−αa)Isinit individuals to be asymptomatic, to obtain a proportion of αa initially
asymptomatic seeds. The asymptomatic individuals has been recently estimated to account for roughly
αa = 0.4 of the infected [22, 63, 64]. Lastly, assuming that infectious individuals have exposed R0 others
themselves on average, we initially seed Einit = R0(Iainit + I
s
init) exposed individuals, where we use recent
estimates of the basic reproduction number of approximately R0 = 2.0 [22, 65, 66].
At the beginning of a model simulation in Scenario A, the initially exposed, asymptomatic, and symp-
tomatic are selected uniformly at random from the population based on the above heuristics, and neither
asymptomatic nor symptomatic seeds cause further exposures in the model. No other states are seeded for
simplicity. We note that the question of initialization can generally never be satisfactorily addressed when
applying a model representing states not observed in reality.
G Mobility patterns
We set the value of the site visit intensities λi,k(t) and vk in our mobility model using the following demographic
and geolocation data, which we also visualize in Figures 15 and 16 for all the considered towns and regions:
• Demographic data: We use publicly available high-resolution population density data provided by
Facebook Data for Good [67]. For our experiments, the respective maps are split into equally-sized
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tiles. The total population of the respective area is proportionally distributed across the available tiles
according to the aggregate population density of each tile. We randomly distribute the individuals of
each tile to six or nine age groups A according to the real demographics of the region, matching the age
groups of the COVID-19 case data collected by the national authorities in Germany and Switzerland,
respectively [42, 43]. Ultimately, these individuals are placed in households of sizes one to five according
to their age categories and the household structure in the respective country [51, 52].
• Geolocation data: We use publicly available geolocation data provided by OpenStreetMap, which
contains the specific location of sites of many different categories in our regions of interest. Specifically,
we retrieve the location of all sites S within five site categories, while we would like to highlight that
one could consider other types of sites available through the OpenStreetMap API [68].
– Education: Schools, universities, and research institutes
– Social : Restaurants, cafes, bars, and pubs
– Transportation: Bus stops
– Work : Offices and shops
– Groceries: Supermarkets and convenience stores
We assume that each individual i ∈ V in age group a(i) ∈ A visits only a constrained set of sites Si ⊆ S.
This reflects the fact that individuals typically study or work at only one place, form habits regarding the
public transportation they use, and social places or supermarkets they visit. To construct Si, we sample
uc different sites from each site category c with probability inversely proportional to the distance from the
individual’s home, where uc = 1 for education, uc = 10 for social, uc = 5 for transportation, uc = 1 for work,
and uc = 2 for groceries.
Moreover, for each individual i and site k ∈ Si, we set the intensity λi,k(t) = ra(i),c(k)/uc(k), where ra(i),c(k)
is a constant value that depends on the individual’s age group a(i) ∈ A and the site type c(k), as shown
in Table 4. Here, we assume people of younger ages spend most of their time in school and social sites,
middle-age people spend most of their time at work and elderly people have lower activity over all. Finally,
for each site k ∈ S, we set the mean duration 1/vk = 1/vc(k) of any visit to the site heuristically according to
the site type c(k). Specifically, we set the mean visit duration at educational sites to 2 hours, at social sites
to 1.5 hours, in public transportation to 12 minutes, at work to 2 hours, and at supermarkets to 30 minutes.
Note that the duration of visits to sites within the categories education and work are set to lower values
than one would expect as real visit durations. This accounts for the fact that people are neither exposed to
all others at the site nor continually exposed during the visit. For instance, an office worker mainly interacts
with a specific subset other people during lunch or group meetings, and students mainly interact with other
students of their class during breaks and study sessions. We emphasize that our epidemiological model is not
constrained to this setting and could be arbitrarily generalized by practitioners if desired or replaced by real
or more fine-grained mobility or tracing data when available.
H Experimental setup for parameter estimation
In this section, we provide additional details on the experimental setup used for parameter estimation via
Bayesian optimization. A summary of the complete estimation procedure is given as Algorithm 3.
H.1 Optimized parameters
As pointed out previously in Section 3, any set of parameters θ can be optimized globally using Bayesian
optimization (BO). However, to improve identifiability and avoid overfitting, we decided to estimate the
transmission rates β = βk and ξ due to infectious individuals at the sites they visit and at their households,
respectively, and the mobility reduction p due to social distancing.
For each of the cities and regions, we run our estimation procedure separately. One central challenge for
parameter estimation using real COVID-19 case data is that the epidemic did not evolve without interventions.
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Algorithm 3 Parameter estimation using Bayesian optimization
Input: Black-box simulator g(θ), parameter domain dom(θ), time horizon T , case data ctrue1:T , hyperparameters N , M , J
1: s(x) := −∑Tt=1(ctruet − xt)2
2: θ1:M ← first M points of Sobol sequence in |θ| dimensions, scaled from unit cube to dom(θ)
3: D ← ∅
4: for i ∈ [M ] do . Initial quasi-random exploration
5: Obtain noisy sim. evaluation g(θi) from J random roll-outs
6: D ← D ∪ {(θi,g(θi))}
7: while |D| ≤ N do . Bayesian Optimization
8: p(g(θ)) | D)← GP(D)
9: θ∗ ← arg maxθ∈dom(θ) KG(θ)
10: Obtain noisy sim. evaluation g(θ∗) from J random roll-outs
11: D ← D ∪ {(θ∗,g(θ∗))}
12: return arg max(θ,g(θ))∈D s(g(θ))
More specifically, the spread of COVID-19 was significantly influenced by social distancing measures and
business restrictions in both Germany and Switzerland during most of the time periods for which data is
available. The period of most restrictive measures, also referred to as the “lockdown”, occurred largely from
March 23, 2020 to May 3, 2020 in Germany, and from March 16, 2020 to May 10, 2020 in Switzerland [48–50].
To be able to make use of COVID-19 data from the entire time period described as Scenario A, we account
for the restrictions in place during the “lockdown” by
(i) scaling down β at sites of specific types to mimic business restrictions and closures. Specifically, we
reduce the individual transmission rate at educational sites, workplaces and social sites by 50% during
the period of the “lockdown”; and,
(ii) letting individuals practice social distancing by skipping a given planned visit in the mobility model with
probability p during the “lockdown”. This social distancing factor p controls how strictly governmental
interventions were followed in a given town and guides how much the case curve flattened during the
“lockdown”.
Here, note that before the “lockdown”, i.e., in periods without intervention, p and the β-multipliers at sites
are ignored by the model. Hence, we jointly estimate the three parameters θ = {β, ξ, p} over the time period
that we denote as Scenario A for a given region, i.e., for a period of approximately two months until the end
of the strict “lockdown” in either country, where all three parameters can be deemed identifiable because the
estimation windows spans periods both before and during times of interventional measures.
H.2 Bounds
Bayesian optimization globally maximizes a black-box function over a constrained domain. However, the
domain dom(θ) of θ = {β, ξ, p} is unbounded, since intensities of counting processes are only required to be
non-negative. Nonetheless, in practice we observe that large values of β and ξ lead to far worse simulated
outcomes than observed in COVID-19 case data, hence being suboptimal. From prior experiments, we
empirically decide to estimate the parameters β and ξ over the domain [0, 1.5] in all regional models, while
keeping p ∈ [0, 1] as p is a probability. The maximization of the knowledge gradient acquisition function is
done using the internal optimization procedures of BoTorch.
H.3 Hyperparameters
We choose to run M = 20 initial quasi-random settings and optimize θ for a total of N = 100 steps for
the computationally less demanding cities, i.e., Tübingen, Kaiserslautern, and Locarno, and for a total of
N = 40 for the computationally more demanding city of Bern, the Canton of Jura, and the Landkreis of
Rheingau-Taunus. Each evaluation of the objective for a given setting θ of our simulator was the mean of
J = 96 random realizations of our model over the time period. As mentioned in Section 3, in addition to the
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stochasticity inherent to the counting processes, the simulations were randomized across realizations of the
mobility traces and the selected individual infection seeds.
H.4 Efficient parameter estimation using downscaled models
In our experiments, for each selected region, we simulate the state, mobility pattern, and contacts of every
single individual in the true population. However, for parameter estimation via Bayesian optimization (BO),
we downscale the models, i.e., we downscale the population and sites by a factor K uniformly at random6,
for efficiency reasons. In this way, we avoid inefficiently long wall times due to worse-than-observed courses of
the epidemic. Refer to Table 5 for details on the downscaling factor K used in each town and region.
I Parameter estimation using downscaled models might fail
As discussed in section H, to boost efficiency, we perform parameter estimation using downscaled models. In
this section, we discuss potential issues one might face when employing downscaled models.
While we have found that using downscaled models for parameter estimation works well in most practical
scenarios, there do exist settings where it can fail. More specifically, the full-scale model may not provide
accurate predictions under the estimated parameters {β, ξ, p} found using the downscaled model. In the
remainder, we analyze one of these settings, the Landkreis of Tirschenreuth in Germany, a rural region with a
high level of infections as of today, as shown in Figure 17. Landkreis Tirschenreuth shows specific properties
that distinguish the area from the other cities and regions we analyzed, which can reveal why parameter
estimation using a downscaled model might fail in some cases.
With a case incidence of 1,575 cases per 100,000 inhabitants as of July 13, 2020 [42], the region is more
affected than the other cities and regions we considered. As a result, 7.69% of the population needs to get
positively tested in order to match the COVID-19 case data under the downscaled model. Considering that
the number of infected individuals might be much higher, this can lead to a significant decrease in the relative
number of susceptible people due to large proportions of the population being either infected or recovered.
For the epidemic to reach the target case incidence, parameter estimation will have to find larger transmission
rates βk to overcome the resulting reduction in infections. In contrast, under the full-scale model, only 1.54%
of the population would have to get positively tested to match the COVID-19 case data, suggesting that the
reduction in the number of susceptible individuals will have a smaller impact. As a consequence, in Landkreis
Tirschenreuth, the predictions under the full size model are too pessimistic, as shown in Figure 17.
On top of that, sites are clustered into a number of villages, as shown in Figure 18a, which is a major
distinguishing factor of Landkreis Tirschenreuth compared to other regions with high infection levels. In
the second most heavily affected area, Tübingen, only 5.42% of the population need to get positively tested
to match the COVID-19 case data under the downscaled model, and the city shows no local clusters in the
population density and site distribution; see Figure 15. As a consequence, removing a large proportion of sites
at random, as shown in Figure 18b, may change the properties of the mobility patterns under the downscaled
model and lead to local and isolated infection herds in which potentially large proportions of the population
are getting infected, further exacerbating the above observations.
When estimating the mobility-related model parameters using downscaled models, we recommend choosing
a conservative scaling factor, such that mobility patterns remain qualitatively similar, and infection levels
continue to be low enough to expect equal exposure dynamics at both scales.
J Narrowcasting the empirical probability of exposure
As recently noted by Chan et al. [57], health authorities may like to use contact tracing data of individuals who
have been tested positive to narrowcast messages to the population, i.e., make public service announcements
that are highly tailored to a location or to a subset of individuals who have been in a certain location during
6Note that we do not downscale the initial state variable seeds and the COVID-19 case counts.
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a specific period of time. For example, health authorities may like to inform the population about the risk
of infection for individuals who visited a specific site in a certain period of time. While some individuals
may be reluctant to adopt contact tracing technology due to privacy concerns, they may still be willing to
follow public service announcements regarding quarantine or testing. For example, an individual may be
willing to self-isolate or seek testing if they learn via narrowcasting that they recently visited a location with
empirically high probability of exposure by other infected individuals.
To implement narrowcasting of exposure risk at sites S, our model allows for the estimation of the empirical
probability of exposure pˆk([t0, tf ]) of an individual during a time window [t0, tf ], caused by positively tested
individuals i that visited site k, i.e.,
pˆk([t0, tf ]) ∝ 1−
∏
i∈S
T+i (t0)=1
exp
(
−
∫ tf
t0
∫ t′
t′−δ
Pi,k(τ)e
−γ(t′−τ) dτ dt′
)
(15)
Perhaps surprisingly, the above computation does not suffer from the “x2 adoption problem” of contact
tracing [22, 38] because it only requires Pi,k(t) of positively tested individuals i, rather than both Pi,k(t) and
Pj,k(t). For the same reason, it also requires data from location-based contact tracing systems where Pi,k(t)
is observed. However, in principle, one could also resort to proximity-based tracing systems if Bluetooth
beacons are in place, as noted by Langford [38].
Figure 19 presents an example of narrowcasting of site-specific exposure probabilities during Scenario
A with the estimated “lockdown” measures. Here, note that, as long as the level of adoption is uniformly
distributed across visitors, the site ranking by exposure probability will be invariant to adoption levels in
expectation. In this case, the absolute value of the probability of exposure can be corrected for the level of
adoption. In practice, it would be important to correct for compliance disparities across sites and site types,
which are likely to occur due to differences in demographics and visiting patterns at certain sites.
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Kaiserslautern Bern
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis Canton Jura
(a) Number of infected
Tübingen Locarno
Kaiserslautern Bern
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis Canton Jura
(b) Reproduction number
Figure 8: Number of infected and effective reproduction number in the realistic scenario. Panel
(a) shows the number of infected in the realistic scenario used for parameter estimation with the “lockdown”
interventions described in Appendix H. The line represents the mean of the number of infected over 48
random realizations of the simulations, the shaded regions correspond to two times the standard deviation.
Panel (b) shows the corresponding effective reproduction number computed using the Bayesian approach in
Bettencourt et al. [69, 70], the line represents the most likely estimate and shading represents high density
areas.
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Figure 9: Early ending “lockdown”. Counterfactual what-if scenario in which the same restrictive measures
that were in place during the “lockdown” period are implemented for shorter time periods. The lines in
panel (a) represent the mean of the number of infected over 48 random realizations of the simulations, the
shaded regions correspond to two times the standard deviation. Panel (b) shows the effective reproduction
number within the scenario of the 4-weeks “lockdown” corresponding to the purple line in panel (a). The line
represents the most likely estimate and shading represents high density areas.
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Figure 10: Alternating curfews. Counterfactual what-if scenario in which the population is divided into
K groups and, on each day, only one group is allowed to follow their usual daily activities. Panel (a) shows
the daily number of infected for different numbers of groups. The lines represent the mean of the number
of infected over 48 random realizations of the simulations, the shaded regions correspond to two times the
standard deviation. Panel (b) shows the effective reproduction number for the scenario of K = 2 groups. The
line represents the most likely estimate and shading represents high density areas.
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Figure 11: Social distancing of vulnerable groups. Counterfactual what-if scenario in which the same
social distancing measures as in the “lockdown” scenario are imposed only on vulnerable groups. Panel (a)
shows the daily number of infected, panel (b) and (c) the hospitalizations and fatalities, respectively. The
lines represent the mean over 48 random realizations of the simulations, the shaded regions correspond to
two times the standard deviation. 30
Tübingen Locarno
Kaiserslautern Bern
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis Canton Jura
Figure 12: Conditional “lockdowns” based on weekly incidence. The panels show the number of
infected people for two single realizations of the simulation of Scenario B. Whenever the number of positive
cases within 7 days exceeds the threshold of 50 per 100,000 inhabitants, we implement the same restrictive
measures that were in place during the “lockdown” period in Scenario A. Dashed and solid vertical lines
indicate beginning and ending of the conditional “lockdowns”, respectively.
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Figure 13: Contact tracing strategies. Numbers of infected for various contact tracing strategies in
Scenario B. Panel (a) shows the efficacy of tracing strategies under full compliance when identified contacts
are isolated and/or tested with different reporting delays. Lines and shading indicate the mean and two times
the standard deviations over 48 random roll-outs. Panel (b) shows the effective reproduction number for the
tracing strategy with isolating and testing all contacts with 48 hours test delay under full compliance. The
line represents the most likely estimate and shading represents high density areas.
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Tübingen Locarno
Kaiserslautern Bern
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis Canton Jura
Figure 14: Advanced testing strategy. Number of infected in Scenario B under the two contact tracing
strategies of isolating and testing all contacts of a positively tested individual with 48 hours test delay and
only testing the 20 contacts with the highest empirical infection probability. Lines and shading indicate the
mean and two times the standard deviations over 48 random initializations. The strategy of testing only 20
contacts reduces the number of conducted tests by 70-90%.
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(a) Site locations in the mobility model of Tübingen (b) Population density in the mobility model of Tübingen
(c) Site locations in the mobility model of Kaiserslautern (d) Population density in the mobility model of Kaiserslautern
(e) Site locations in the mobility model of
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis
(f) Population density in the mobility model of
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis
Figure 15: Spatial distribution of site locations and population density in the mobility models of
Tübingen, Kaiserslautern, and the Landkreis of Rheingau-Taunus, Germany. In the left column,
circles depict schools, universities and research institutes (blue), social places (orange), bus stops (green),
workplaces (red), and supermarkets (purple). In the right column, purple and orange colors correspond to
low and high population density areas, respectively.
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(a) Site locations in the mobility model of Locarno (b) Population density in the mobility model of Locarno
(c) Site locations in the mobility model of Bern (d) Population density in the mobility model of Bern
(e) Site locations in the mobility model of Canton Jura (f) Population density in the mobility model of Canton Jura
Figure 16: Spatial distribution of site locations and population density in the mobility models
of Locarno, Bern and the Canton of Jura, Switzerland. The colors depict the same categories and
densities as in Figure 15.
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Figure 17: Cumulative number of positively tested individuals for Landkreis Tirschenreuth,
Germany. The blue line corresponds to the calibration scenario in which the population and the sites are
scaled down by a factor of ten. The red line corresponds to the full scale simulation. Line and shading
indicate mean and two times the standard deviation over 48 random initialization.
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(a) Site locations, full scale
(b) Site locations, downsampled
(c) Population density
Figure 18: Site locations and population density in Tirschenreuth, Germany. Panel (a) corresponds
to the spatial site distribution of the full scale version, while panel (b) shows a downsampled version in which
the number of sites is reduced by a factor of ten. Colors represent site types as defined in Figure 15. Panel (c)
shows the population density taken from Facebook Data for Good [67]. Purple and orange colors correspond
to relative low and high density of homes in the region, respectively.
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(a) Narrowcasting, Tübingen (b) Narrowcasting, Locarno
(c) Narrowcasting, Kaiserslautern (d) Narrowcasting, Bern
(e) Narrowcasting, Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis (f) Narrowcasting, Canton Jura
Figure 19: Narrowcasting of exposure probabilities at sites during a week-long window of the
observed lockdown scenario of Figure 8. Circles represent sites and the size of each circle is proportional
to the site’s empirical probability of exposure of a visiting individual during the time period of two weeks.
Colors represent site types as defined in Figures 15 and 16.
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Table 2: Epidemiological distributions and model parameters in units of days. The hospitalization and fatality
rates αh and αb mentioned in the main paper are estimated from COVID-19 case data in a studied region
and is age-dependent. Log-normal parameters indicate the mean and standard deviation of the underlying
normal distribution.
Counting process Starts when logN parameters Source
Mi(t) dEi(t) = 1 (0.9470, 0.6669)‡ [60]
Rsi (t), R
a
i (t) dI
s
i (t) = 1 (2.6365, 0.0713)
§ [66, 71, 72]
Wi(t) dI
p
i (t) = 1 (0.7463, 0.4161)
§ [71]
Yi(t) dI
s
i (t) = 1 (1.9358, 0.1421)§ [73]
Zi(t) dI
s
i (t) = 1 (2.5620, 0.0768)§ [61]
Parameter Value Description Source
αa 0.4 proportion of asymptomatic individuals [22, 63, 64]
µ 0.55 relative asymptomatic transmission rate [25]
γ 0.3465h−1 decay of infectiousness at sites [37]
δ 4.6438h window of non-contact contamination¶ [37]
‡ Incubation period from [60], here corrected not to encompass the estimated time of pre-symptomatic infectiousness [71].
§ Approximate log-normal parameters constructed because COVID-19 literature results only reported using mean or median
estimates of times.
¶ For computational purposes, set from γ by the time when rate of infection drops below 20% after leaving a site.
Table 3: Summary of towns and regions studied in Germany and Switzerland. (Land)Kreis denotes the
district-level, Kanton the state-level administrative unit in Germany and Switzerland, respectively. Incidence
denotes the number of COVID-19 cases per 100,000 inhabitants registered before July 13, 2020 and was taken
at Landkreis and Kanton-level from data provided by the national authorities [42, 43].
Region Country Population Incidence Severe? Urban?
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis GER 187,157 144.8 - -
Kanton Jura CH 73,419 355.5 - -
Kaiserslautern GER 99,845 200.7 - X
Bern CH 133,883 191.4 - X
Locarno CH 15,826 943.8 X -
Tübingen GER 90,546 570.1 X X
Table 4: Average number ra(i),c(k) of visits per week to sites of type c(k) by individuals of age group a(i) ∈ A.
The splits into age groups reflect the COVID-19 case data in Germany [42] and was extended equivalently to
models in Switzerland with slightly more age groups [43].
Age Group a(i) Education Social Transportation Work Groceries
0-4 5 1 - - -
5-14 5 2 3 - -
15-34 2 2 3 3 1
35-59 - 2 1 5 1
60-79 - 3 2 - 1
80+ - 2 1 - 1
39
Table 5: Start and end dates in the year 2020 together with downscaling factors K used for model calibration
in the case study. Start dates are chosen such that a given region had approximately five to ten confirmed
COVID-19 cases, allowing for non-degenerate and comparable initial conditions.
Region Country K Start calibration Start lockdown End calibration
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis GER 10 March 10 March 23 May 3
Kanton Jura CH 10 March 9 March 16 May 10
Kaiserslautern GER 10 March 15 March 23 May 3
Bern CH 10 March 6 March 16 May 10
Locarno CH 2 March 9 March 16 May 10
Tübingen GER 10 March 12 March 23 May 3
Table 6: Parameter values found in model calibration separately for each selected region. Recall that β
denotes the individual transmission rate at public sites, ξ the individual transmission rate in households, and
p the social distancing factor, only active during the lockdown period listed in Table 5.
Region Country β ξ p
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis GER 0.1875 0.9375 0.8750
Kanton Jura CH 0.1406 0.7031 0.8438
Kaiserslautern GER 0.3004 0.4548 0.6327
Bern CH 0.4688 0.2812 0.9375
Locarno CH 0.7607 0.5394 0.9181
Tübingen GER 0.7450 1.0842 0.8116
Table 7: Proportions of the population that have been positively tested until the end of the lockdown period
according to the COVID-19 case data provided by the public health authorities. The right column shows the
corresponding proportion in the downscaled simulation.
Region Country Downscaling % pos. tested, full scale % pos. tested, downscaled
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis GER 10 0.106 1.063
Kanton Jura CH 10 0.279 2.792
Kaiserslautern GER 10 0.124 1.240
Bern CH 10 0.176 1.756
Locarno CH 2 0.916 1.833
Tübingen GER 10 0.542 5.423
Tirschenreuth GER 5 1.537 7.685
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